how to strengthen our financial system, including our system of financial regulation and supervision, to reduce the frequency and severity of bouts of financial instability in the future. In this regard, some particularly thorny issues are raised by the existence of financial institutions that may be perceived as "too big to fail" and the moral hazard issues that may arise when governments intervene in a financial crisis. As you know, in March the Federal Reserve acted to prevent the default of the investment bank Bear Stearns. For reasons that I will discuss shortly, those actions were necessary and justified under the circumstances that prevailed at that time. However, those events also have consequences that must be addressed. In particular, if no countervailing actions are taken, what would be perceived as an implicit expansion of the safety net could exacerbate the problem of "too big to fail," possibly resulting in excessive risk-taking and yet greater systemic risk in the future. Mitigating that problem is one of the design challenges that we face as we consider the future evolution of our system. As both the nation's central bank and a financial regulator, the Federal Reserve must be well prepared to make constructive contributions to the coming national debate on the future of the financial system and financial regulation. Accordingly, we have set up a number of internal working groups, consisting of governors, Reserve Bank presidents, and staff, to study these and related issues. That work is ongoing, and I do not want to prejudge the outcomes. However, in the remainder of my remarks today I will raise, in a preliminary way, what I see as some promising approaches for reducing systemic risk. I will begin by discussing steps that are already under way to strengthen the financial infrastructure in a manner that should increase the resilience of our financial system. I will then turn to a discussion of regulatory and supervisory practice, with particular attention to whether a more comprehensive, systemwide perspective in financial supervision is warranted. For the most part, I will leave for another occasion the issues of broader structural and statutory change, such as those raised by the Treasury's blueprint for regulatory reform.2
Although we at the Federal Reserve remain focused on addressing the current risks to economic and financial stability, we have also begun thinking about the lessons for the future. I have discussed today two strategies for reducing systemic risk: strengthening the financial infrastructure, broadly construed, and increasing the systemwide focus of financial regulation and supervision. Work on the financial infrastructure is already well under way, and I expect further progress as the public and private sectors cooperate to address common concerns.

我也来试试吧.

用何种方式增强我们的金融体制（包括金融监管）以便降低以后金融不稳定的频繁性与严重性。就此，被人们认为“太大而不会失败”的金融制度的存在以及在政府对金融危机干预时导致的道德风险问题的存在引发了一些相当棘手的问题。如你所知，三月份联邦储备所采取了应对贝尔史登公司投资银行违约的措施。对此做法的原因，我不久会加以讨论。那些应对措施也是必须的并且在那种情况下有道理的，也是那个时候常用到的。然而，那些做法也会产生必须加以应付的后果。尤其在不采取反补贴措施的情况下，被人们当作安全网的隐型扩张将会加剧“太大而不会失败”这个问题，有可能导致承担过度风险和未来更大的系统风险。让该问题得以缓解是我们考虑未来系统演变时得面对的设计挑战难题之一。作为国家的中央银行与金融调节器，联邦储备所必须做好充分准备，以便对即将来临的金融系统与金融管理未来的全国性争辩做出建设性贡献。因此，我们已经成立了一些由政府工作人员，储备银行的董事与员工组成的间歇性工作团队来研究这些或者相关问题。