We study relationships between shareholder proposal activism, managerial response, and corporate social performance (CSP). We find that shareholder proposal activism reduces CSP. We infer that rather than pressuring firms to improve CSP, activism may engender diversion of resources away from CSP into political activities used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion. We also find that managers are more likely to settle proposals filed by ‘salient’ shareholders (i.e., those with power, legitimacy, and urgency). Settlement with salient shareholders, however, also reduces CSP, suggesting that managers’ responses are symbolic; i.e., they settle with salient shareholders to demonstrate conformance but continue to resist making the substantive
changes to core policies that may compromise their discretion. Copyright  2007 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

我们的研究之间的关系的股东，建议的积极性，管理的回应，和企业的社会表现者（ CSP ） 。我们发现，股东建议的积极性，减少总警司。我们可以推断，而非施压，以改善公司的总警司，积极性可能会产生的资源转用于远离总警司到政治活动所使用的管理，以抵御外部压力和保留酌情权。我们还发现，经理人更容易解决的建议，提交的'突出'的股东（即，那些与权力，合法性和紧迫性） 。解决具有鲜明的股东，不过，也减少了总警司，表明经理人的反应是象征性，即他们解决具有鲜明的股东以显示一致性，但继续抵制作出实质性
更改为核心的政策，可能会妥协，他们的酌情权。版权 2007年约翰
Wiley ＆ Sons出版有限公司