能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Such concern would be elicited by their ownership incentives.We also use this term to refer to concentrated external investors overseeing or controlling executive decisions. Concentrated investors’ inducement for controlling executive decisions likewise is elicited by ownership incentives. In our view, the balance of power amongst the CEO, the
concentrated external owners, and the outside board members may determine the extent of the influence of the outside directors on corporate acquisition outcomes. More specifically, in the context of agency theory, we question the existence of a substitutability effect regarding monitoring
activities by external board members. Our goal is to examine whether monitoring by the outside board members, in the setting of limited ownership control structures (i.e., limited CEO ownership and limited external ownership), determines acquisition outcomes. We contend that monitoring may be activated by inducements of ownership incentives
(blockholder investors, owner–managers, owner–directors) or by directors’ concern for their professional obligations and reputations (labor markets for directors).

这种关注将由股权激励引导出来。我们也使用这个术语来指外界大投资者的监督或控制经营管理决策。使大投资者控制经营管理决策同样是由所有权激励引导的。在我们看来，首席执行官与外界大投资者，外部董事会成员权力的均衡将决定外部董事在企业收购成本上的影响程度。尤其在代理理论的背景下，就外部委员会成员的监督活动而言，我们对替代效应的存在表示怀疑。我们的目标是在有限股权结构（即首席执行官和外界投资者有限的股权）的背景下考查外部委员会成员的监督是否决定收购成本。我们主张在股权激励（大股东投资者，管理者，董事）或董事对他们的职业责任或名声（董事的劳动力市场）的诱导下监督将被激活。