能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
There is an increasing amount of literature on director monitoring, ownership control, managerial discretion and the economic outcomes of corporate strategies (e.g., Johnsonet al., 1993; Kroll et al., 1997; Rhoadeset al., 2000).Based on agency theory, our intention is to provide additional insight into the efficacy of a governance mechanism, namely, the substitution effect of monitoring by the outside directors in determining the economic outcomes of corporate acquisition strategy. For the purpose of this study, we use the term ‘‘monitoring’’ to encompass outside board members controlling managerial decisions so that they would contribute to shareholders’ interests. The predisposition of outside board members to monitor may be due to these board members’ concern for their professional duties, reputations, or ownership incentives. Alternatively, we use the term monitoring to refer to managerial self-control or the concern that managers’ decisions are shareholder oriented.

核心词汇：
director mornitoring:董事监督
ownership control:股权控制
managerial discretion:经营自主权
economic outcomes:成本
ownership incentives：股权激励
agency theory:代理理论


关于董事监督，股权控制，经营自主权以及企业策略成本的文献日增（例如：约翰逊等人，1993；克罗尔等人，1997；诺阿德斯等人，2000）。根据代理理论，我们的目的是为管理机制的功效提供新的洞察，换句话说，依靠外部董事监督的替代效果来决定企业收购策略成本。为了这个研究目的，我们使用“监督”这个术语来包含外部董事会成员对经营决策的控制，而这将有助于股东的利益。外部董事会成员约束的倾向取决于他们对自己的职业责任，名声及股权激励的关注。我们也可能使用“监督”这个术语来指经营自控或者对以股东为导向的管理者决策的关注。