能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
The following example illustrates agency conflicts and economic outcomes that may be associated with acquisitions. In May 1999, Emerson Electric announced its intention to acquire Daniel Industries for $460 million. Unfortunately, Emerson Electric’s shareholders experienced a decline of $2.58 per share on the news, which represented
approximately a 5% decline in the company’s market value. Emerson’s management contended that combining Daniel Industries’ reputation in the oil and gas industry would help increase its penetration in the process control and industry automation business (Anonymous, 1999). Securities analysts were not as optimistic about Emerson’s growth prospects.
Emerson had been acquiring smaller companies in the past, had problems with slow growth, and was ignoring the telecommunications and electronics market. These realities led some industry observers to conclude Emerson’s management’s intention was to forego meaningful growth-oriented acquisitions in favor of keeping its earnings record intact
(Little, 2002).Within a few months the stock price had fallen 33%, to about $40. It should be noted that at that time Emerson Electric was manager controlled, with a board dominated by insiders. While acquisition announcements do not normally result in such shareholder loss, we chose acquisitions as an appropriate means by which to study the effect on acquisition outcomes of external board monitoring as a substitution possibility.
The following example illustrates agency conflicts and economic outcomes that may be associated with acquisitions. In May 1999, Emerson Electric announced its intention to acquire Daniel Industries for $460 million. Unfortunately, Emerson Electric’s shareholders experienced a decline of $2.58 per share on the news, which represented
approximately a 5% decline in the company’s market value. Emerson’s management contended that combining Daniel Industries’ reputation in the oil and gas industry would help increase its penetration in the process control and industry automation business (Anonymous, 1999). Securities analysts were not as optimistic about Emerson’s growth prospects.
Emerson had been acquiring smaller companies in the past, had problems with slow growth, and was ignoring the telecommunications and electronics market. These realities led some industry observers to conclude Emerson’s management’s intention was to forego meaningful growth-oriented acquisitions in favor of keeping its earnings record intact
(Little, 2002).Within a few months the stock price had fallen 33%, to about $40. It should be noted that at that time Emerson Electric was manager controlled, with a board dominated by insiders. While acquisition announcements do not normally result in such shareholder loss, we chose acquisitions as an appropriate means by which to study the effect on acquisition outcomes of external board monitoring as a substitution possibility.

我还以为真这么长，原来是两段重复的。




下面的例子说明了代理矛盾和与收购相关的经济成本。在1999年5月，爱默生电力公司宣布了想用460万美元收购丹尼尔企业的意图。不幸的是爱默生电力的股东听到这个消息后每股跌了2.58美元，这相当于表示公司市场值下降5％。爱默生电力的管理者声称联合丹尼尔企业在油气行业的名气将有助于增强在工序控制及行业自动化操作的渗透力。（匿名，1999）。关于爱默生的发展前景的安全性分析不太乐观。
爱默生曾收购了一些更小的企业，存在发展缓慢以及忽视通信和电力市场的问题。这些事实导致一些行业的观察者推断爱默生管理人员的意图是在放弃有意义的以发展为导向能够保持盈利记录无损的收购。（利特，2002）在几个月内股票跌了33％，将近40％。需要提出的是在那时爱默生电力由管领人员控制，董事由内部支配。当收购声明在正常情况下没有导致股东如此损失时，我们选择收购作为研究替代外部董事监查收购成本可能性的效果的合适方法。