能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Related research suggests acquisitions are significant strategic decisions and are controversial because often they are no better than break-even propositions for the owners of acquiring firms (Hitt et al., 2001; Morck et al., 1990). Moreover, target firm managers have become more skilled at extracting higher prices for their firms (Bradley et al., 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). At the heart of the controversy surrounding acquisitions is whether takeovers enhance shareholder value.
According to agency theory, acquisitions may not be beneficial for shareholders and may be made because takeovers benefit the senior executives. Indeed, top managers may pursue a variety of private interests at the expense of stockholders. Managerial apathy in safeguarding the interests of the stockholders (agency problems), however, may be reduced— through monitoring by outside board members. Agency
problems also may be reduced by CEO ownership incentives (promoting responsible executive self-control) or via concentrated external ownership incentives (bolstering blockholder control). In this study, we focus on the determinants of economic outcomes of acquisitions because acquisition events are discrete and easily discernible, and their occurrence may be readily affirmed (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Furthermore, economic outcomes of acquisitions can be assessed objectively using the event-study methodology, a commonly used method to assess abnormal stock price returns within the finance (Brown and Warner, 1985) and strategic management (Wright et al., 2002a,b) literatures. We also examine corporate strategy outcomes by resorting to return on assets as a proxy for economic outcomes.

相关研究表明收购是重要的策略决策，同时也是有争议的，因为它们通常和业主收购企业的保本方案没有两样。（希特等，2001；莫克等，1990）此外，目标公司的管理者在为他们的公司索取高价越来越娴熟。（布瑞德利等，1988；贾雷尔和鲍尔森，1989）。围绕收购争论的关键是经营权的接收能否增加股东的价值。
根据代理理论，收购可能对股东无利，而可能这样是因为对高级经营主管人员有利。事实上，高级管理人员可能在以损害股东利益为代价的情况下谋取种种私利。然而通过外部董事监督，可能减少在管理上对维护股东利益的冷漠。（代理问题）代理问题同样可以由CEO股权激励（增强责任经营管理自控）或通过外界大股东股权激励来减少。在本研究中，我们把注意力集中在收购成本的决定因素上，因为收购事件互不相关，容易识别，而且它们的发生易于确认（哈勒布连和芬克斯坦，1990）。另外，收购成本能够使用事件研究法进行客观评估，事件研究法是一种用来评估异常股票价格在金融运作和策略管理下恢复的方法。（赖特等，2002a,b）我们也考察公司成本策略求助于返还作为成本取代物的资产。