能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Researchers adopting the substitution perspective accept the agency problem associated with the management of publicly traded enterprises. Their desire is to explore the relative effectiveness of various governance mechanisms in confronting agent opportunism through monitoring activities. The expectation is that one governance mechanism may take the place of other governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs.
The remainder of our paper is sequentially organized into several parts. First, we develop our hypotheses based on our review of the related literature. Then, we specify our sample and methodology and present our findings. Finally, we provide our concluding discussion.

这篇短，先翻这篇。


采纳替代观点的研究者承认代理问题与公开交易的企业管理有关。他们想探索当遇到通过监督行为的代理投机主义时不同管理机制的相对效力。期望在降低代理费时一管理机制可替代另一管理机制。
我们论文的剩余部分依次分为几部分。首先，我们在回顾相关文献的基础上，完善了我们的假设。然后，我们具体分析了我们案例和方法论，并得出我们的研究成果。最后，我们得出结论。