能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
In contrast, where external ownership is concentrated (5% or more of the outstanding shares), we identify firms as owner controlled. Concentrated external owners or blockholder investors possess pecuniary incentives to promote valueenhancing corporate strategies through their monitoring efforts. In this setting, monitoring by blockholders may replace the need for outside director monitoring. Furthermore, where CEOs have significant equity stakes (2% or more of the outstanding shares) in their organizations, we identify firms as owner–manager controlled. Owner–manager- controlled firms may be associated with beneficial corporate strategies because their top executives posses financial incentives for self-monitoring. Hence, where CEOs have significant shareholdings in enterprises, their ownership incentives may likewise lessen the need for outside director monitoring.
Given our discussion, it may be expected that monitoring by outside directors would be prominent in manager-controlled firms in response to weak external ownership pressure and limited managerial ownership incentives. Consequently, we anticipate the proportion of outside board members will be directly related to economic outcomes of acquisitions of manager-controlled firms. However, we do not expect the proportion of outside board members to significantly influence the acquisition outcomes of owner-controlled or owner– manager-controlled firms—where external shareholdings are concentrated or where CEOs are significant owners. That is because the presence of concentrated external ownership or significant CEO ownership might lessen the need for intense board monitoring as ownership stakes may obviate board monitoring.

相反，当外部股权集中（5％或以上的已发行股票），我们把此类公司定为业主控制型。集中的外部业主或大股东拥有金钱激励通过他们的监督效力来促使公司策略增值。在这个背景下，大股东监督可能取代外部董事监督。而且，当CEO在他们的组织中拥有重大股权时（2％或以上的已发行股票），我们将此类公司定为业主－管理者控制型。业主－管理者控制型公司可能与有益的公司策略联系在一起，因为他们的高级管理人员拥有财务激励来进行自我监控。因此，当CEO在公司拥有重大股权时，他们的股权激励可能减少对外界董事监督的需求。
考虑到我们的讨论，可以预料外部董事监督可能在管理者控制型公司比较显著作为对较弱的外部股权压力和有限管理的股权激励的反应。因此，我们估计外部董事成员的比例和管理者控制型公司的收购成本有直接联系。然而，我们不认为外部董事成员的比例对业主控制型或业主－管理者控制型公司（外部股权集中或CEO是重要股权所有者）有重要影响。那是因为集中的外部股权或CEO控重大股权的存在可能减少强的外部董事监督烈，因为所有权股份将排除董事监督。