能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Hambrick and Jackson (2000) propose that outside directors would have higher pecuniary incentives to be effective monitors with greater equity investments in the enterprise. The reason is that as the ownership stakes of the directors increase, their interests presumably become more aligned with those of the shareholders. Therefore, ownership might motivate the outside board members to vigilantly monitor corporate acquisition strategy. In conformance with the reasoning adopted in this study, absent effective self-monitoring or blockholder monitoring that characterize manager-controlled firms, we expect the equity stakes of outside board members to be positively associated with acquisition outcomes. In ownercontrolled or owner–manager-controlled firms, however, we do not anticipate the equity stakes of outside directors to play a significant role in determining the economic outcomes of corporate acquisitions. The reason is that blockholder monitoring or self-monitoring, due to concentrated externalownership or significant CEO ownership, may replace the need for owner–director monitoring.
The following hypotheses capture the expectations of our study: Hypothesis 1: In manager-controlled firms, the proportion of outside board members will be positively associated with the economic outcomes of acquisitions, but not in ownercontrolled or owner–manager-controlled firms.
Hypothesis 2: In manager-controlled firms, the ownership of outside board members will be positively associated with the economic outcomes of acquisitions, but not in ownercontrolled or owner–manager-controlled firms.

10.此外，法玛和詹森（1983）与汉布瑞克和约翰逊（2000）提议外部股东将和公司的大股东有更高的金钱激励来进行有效监督。原因是董事股权增加，他们的利益可能变的和股东利益联系更紧密。因此，股权将激励外部董事警觉的监督公司收购策略。和本研究所采纳的论证相一致，缺乏有效的自我监控或大股东监督成为业主——管理者控制型公司的特征，我们预料外部董事股权必然和收购成本相联系。然而，在业主控制型或业主——管理者控制型公司，我们预料外部董事股权在决定公司收购成本上并不扮演重要角色。原因是大股东监督或自我监控，由于集中的外部股权或CEO重大股权可能会取代业主的需求——董事监督。
接下来的假说将表明我们研究的期望：假说1：在管理者控制型公司，外部董事的比例将必然和收购成本相联系，但是在业主控制型或业主——管理者控制型公司则另当别论。
假说2：在管理者控制型公司，外部董事的股权将必然和收购成本相关，但是在业主控制型或业主——管理者控制型公司除外。