能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Organizations, however, may utilize various governance mechanisms in limiting agent opportunism via monitoring activities. Note that concentrated shareholdings by blockholder investors may provide ownership incentives for effective monitoring (Kroll et al., 1997; Wright et al., 2002a). Similarly, significant shareholdings of CEOs may provide effective monitoring—self-monitoring elicited by their equity stakes (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Griffith, 1999). External monitoring or self-monitoring, induced by ownership incentives, may promote the efficient utilization of firm resources. As suggested earlier, outside directors may also serve as effective monitors of executive decisions regarding corporate resource allocations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Wright et al., 2002b). We contend that relative influences on firm outcomes of various monitors may be contingent on the form of corporate control.
Prior research has distinguished among various forms of corporate control (e.g., Kroll et al., 1997). In conformance with prior research, we identify firms as manager controlled where external ownership is diffused and CEO ownership is limited (explained in the Sample and Methodology section). The diffused stockholders, because of their small stakes, do not have the financial incentive to scrutinize managerial decisions closely, as the cost of such scrutiny would be significant. Therefore, senior executives may have opportunities for the pursuit of self-interest, as their decisions are unlikely to be challenged by diffused shareholders who are anticipated to be passive monitors. Top managers also mayneglect the interests of shareholders because of their own limited ownership incentives inducing low self-monitoring with respect to the adoption of efficient firm strategies. Under these circumstances, monitoring by external board members may replace other monitoring options that may be ineffective (weak self-monitoring by agents or weak external monitoring by investors due to low ownership incentives).

然而组织可能利用各种管理机制通过监督活动来限制代理投机主义。需要提出的是大股东对于有效的监督也可能提供股权激励。（克罗尔等人，1997；赖特等人，2002a）。类似的，首席执行官的重大股权也可能提供有效监督——由他们的股权所引发的自我监控（法码，1980；法玛和詹森，1983；格里菲斯，1999）。由股权激励引发的外部监督和自我监控，都可能促进公司资源的有效利用。正如前面所提议的，外部董事也可能作为关于公司资源分配的行政决策有效监督者。（法玛和詹森，1983；莱特等人，2002b）、我们主张关于公司成本的各种监督者的相关影响视公司控制形式而定。前面的研究对各种公司控制形式作了辨识。（例如，克罗尔等人，1997）和前面的研究一致，我们识别了由管理人员控制的公司，在那里外部股权被散发而首席执行官的股权受限制。（在案例和方法论部分有解释）分散的股东，由于它们所占股份很小，当细察的成本变的重要时，无财务激励来准确细察管理决策。因此高级管理人员可能趁机谋求私利，因为被预料为被动监督的分散的股东对他们的决策不可能提出异议。高级管理人员也可能忽视股东的利益，因为他们自己有限的股权激励所引发的关于公司有效策略的采纳方面自我监控很差。在这种情况下，外部董事成员的监督也许会替代其它可能无效监督方式。（代理人较差的自我监控或因为小股权激励的较差的外部投资者的监督）