能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
Literature review and hypotheses
Both normative and positive agency literatures posit that executive contracts may not perfectly align the interests of top managers and shareholders (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Wright et al., 1996). To the extent that there is a gap in this alignment, agency costs will accrue. Agency relationships are characteristic of all publicly held corporations. Inherent in an agency relationship is the separation between the management of a firm and its shareholders. With such separation, there will be some divergence between the agent’s pursuit of self-serving strategies and those strategies that would enhance the welfare of the principal (Berle and
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wright et al., 2002a,b). Because of this divergence in managerial interests versus owners’ interests, monitoring managerial decisions may become necessary. Consequently, boards of directors are authorized to monitor CEO decisions to protect the interests of shareholders.
More specifically, outside board members who are in a position to observe and control key corporate decisions, and hence to constrain managerial self-interest, may serve as effective monitors of the publicly held enterprises. Outside directors are board members who are not employed by the firm on whose board they serve, while inside directors are board members who are also the firm’s managers. Although some researchers question the effectiveness of outside directors because they can be co-opted by CEOs (e.g., Wade and O’Reilly, 1990), a preponderance of insiders as board members nevertheless suggests weak monitoring (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Vance et al., 1983). Alternatively, it has been argued that outside directors may be more vigilant monitors of top management on behalf of stockholders since they are less beholden to the CEO (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Wright et al., 2002b) and have a greater incentive to monitor due to their concern for their professional obligations or reputations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Indeed, with more outsiders as board members, CEO dismissal becomes more likely if corporate outcomes are poor (Warner et al., 1988). Moreover, following poor corporate outcomes, corporations tend to add more outsiders to their boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988).

7.文献回顾和假说
无论是规范的还是正面的代理文献都认为行政合同可能无法完美统一最高经营管理者和股东的利益（比蒂和扎杰克，1994；莱特等人，1996 ）。在某种程度上这种联盟存在缺陷，即代理成本增加。代理关系是所有上市公司的特征。公司管理人员和股东的分离是代理关系的固有属性。在这种分离下，代理人追逐私利的策略和那些可能增加委托人福利的策略相分歧。（伯利和米恩斯，1932；詹森和梅克林，1976；莱特等人，2002a,b）因为管理人员与业主的利益有分歧，监督管理决策或许是必要的。因此，董事会成员被授权监督CEO的决策来保护股东的权力。
更特别的，外部董事会成员处于观察和控制公司主要决策的位置，因而能限制通过管理谋私利，也许能作为上市公司的有效监督者。外部董事成员是不受他们董事所在公司雇佣的董事成员，而内部董事既是董事成员，同时也是公司管理者。尽管一些研究者质疑外部动董事的效力，因为他们可能被CEO增补进来，（例如，韦德和欧瑞利，1990），然而作为内部董事成员的优势却表现出弱的监督力。（比蒂和扎杰克，1994；旺斯，1983）另外，也有人主张代表股东利益的外部董事对高级管理人员可能具有更灵敏的监督既然他们对CEO不太抱有感激之心，而且由于对他们的专业职责和名声的关注，因而对监督更具激励。确实，将更多的外部人员作为董事成员时，如果公司成本不理想，（沃纳等人，1988）则CEO被解雇的可能性更大。（荷马林和维斯巴克，1988）另外，在公司成本很糟后，公司将趋向于增加更多的外部人员到董事会。