能翻多少是多少吧，谢谢大家了！
3. Sample and methodology
3.1. Sample
A list of firms that announced and completed major acquisitions from 1985 through 1995 was obtained from various Almanac Editions of Mergers and Acquisitions. Only firms that made a major acquisition were retained in the sample. According to Franks et al. (1991), the relative size of the acquisition is important, as only a major acquisition is likely to affect corporate value. A major acquisition is recognized as one that increases the sales of the acquiring firm by at least 10% (Kroll et al., 1997; Tosi and Gomez- Mejia, 1989). We excluded firms from the sample if they made more than one acquisition during the year of the announcement. This criterion insured that outcomes associated with an acquisition announcement were not influenced by factors related to other acquisitions. As two of our three performance measures were based on the event-study methodology, only those enterprises with announcement dates of acquisitions available from The Wall Street Journal Index were retained. This index also was reviewed for the presence of firm-specific major news stories involving our sample firms (occurring within 30 days of the acquisition announcements) that might have confounded our event study results. Firms with such news stories were deleted. Moreover, only firms for which trading data were available from the CRSP database were included. We also excluded corporations in service industries to assure that differences unique to service firms would not distort the analysis (Bharadwaj and Menon, 1993). The firms remaining in the sample consisted of mining and manufacturing firms with four-digit industry classifications ranging from 1000 to 4999. Ownership and director data of the firms were obtained from company proxy reports.
Our final sample consisted of 306 publicly traded corporations. Of this number, 205 firms were identified as owner– manager controlled and/or owner controlled. That is, their CEOs owned at least 2% of the outstanding shares and/or their concentrated owners had amongst them at least one external 5% owner. Five percent ownership is the point atwhich the SEC has determined that ownership stakes justify requiring public disclosure. A total of 101 firms remaining were identified as manager controlled. These firms had neither an owner–manager as CEO nor an external concentrated owner as described in this paragraph. Given our hypotheses, we needed to analyze two subsamples. First, we wanted to examine our hypotheses in the context of the group of 101 manager-controlled enterprises. Second, we wanted to examine the hypotheses in the setting of ownercontrolled and/or owner–manager-controlled enterprises. To form the latter subsample, we randomly chose 101 firms from the 205 firms that were identified as owner–manager or owner-controlled enterprises.

11.3.案例和方法论
3.1.案例
从1985到1995年宣布或完成重大收购的公司名单可从各种公司并购年鉴版获得。案例只保留完成重大收购的公司。通过弗兰克思等人（1991），收购的相对大小很重要，因为只有重要的收购才可能影响公司的估值。增加并购公司10％的销售额才能被认为是一个重大收购。（克罗尔等人，1997；托西和戈麦兹－梅贾，1989）。我们将在宣布收购那年有多个收购的公司排除在案例在外。这条准则为了确保成本和一个收购声明相关，而不受其它的有关收购的因素的影响。因为我们三个绩效指标中的两个基于事件研究法，我们只保留那些在华尔街日报索引里能找到收购声明日期的公司。此索引同时也用来检阅涉及我们案例公司（发生在收购声明的30天内）的特定公司的重大新闻报道的存在，这类公司可能我们的研究结果。而且，案例只包括能在美国股市资料库里找到交易数据的公司。同时我们还排除服务行业的公司以确保服务公司独特的差别不会歪曲我们的分析。（巴拉德瓦杰和梅农，1993）。案例中的公司包括属于从1000到4999四位数的产业分类的矿业和制造业公司。公司的股权和董事资料可从公司的代理报告中获得。
我们最终的案例包括306个公开交易的公司。其中有205个被定为业主——管理者控制型，或业主控制型公司。即CEO占有至少2％的已发行股票，或他们的集中业主占有5％的外部股权。5％股权是由美国证券交易委员会确定的拥有此股权的股东要求信息披露是合理的股权比例，。留下的总共101个公司被确定为管理者控制型公司。这类公司既无业主——管理者作为CEO，或如本文所描述的外部大股东。考虑到我们的假说，我们需要分析两个子案例。首先，我们想在101个管理控制型公司为组的背景下检验我们的假说。其次，我们想在业主控制型或业主——管理者控制型公司的背景下检验我们的假说。为建立后面的子案例，我们从205个被定为业主——管理者或业主控制型公司中随机选择101个。